LTG Helmly on the 98th Division Deployment

Found an Article about the 98th Division’s deployment to Iraq. (This is the unit I deployed with in Sep 2004) This deployment was discussed as a pivotal and sea state change deployment for the Army Reserve by the USAR Commander at the time LTG James R. Helmly.

As a side note -I had the opportunity to work for General Helmly when he was the 78th Division Commander where I was the senior Civilian for the 1st Brigade at the time. He was a no nonsense commander that worked thru all obstacles. I recall staff meetings where he regularly dammed the bureaucracy and insisted on getting tasks done quickly.

Here is some of the Combat Studies Institutes interview with LTG Helmly as it related to our deployment:

When the 98th Division (Institutional Training) deployed to Iraq in 2004-2005, Major General James R. Helmly was the chief of Army Reserve and commanding general of United States Army Reserve Command. In this interview, focusing on the 98th’s deployment and conduct of its Iraqi Army training and advisory mission and related larger issues, Helmly relates how early on he saw a need to reconstitute the Iraqi forces, a chronic shortage of US Special Forces to train them, and thought to himself, “Why can’t we use our table of distribution and allowances organized institutional training divisions and training support divisions?” The biggest problem he encountered in developing this idea was actually resident in his own staff. “That is, they kept coming back with the schoolbook answer. So we had a ‘Come to Jesus’ meeting one day and I slammed the door and said to them, ‘Goddamn it! Let me make it abundantly clear what we’re going to do….You could sort of see the eyes opening on these guys and they finally understood.” After the concept was briefed and accepted, Helmly states that another group of problems arose from “this bastardized system of request for forces (RFF). Instead of being given
a mission or a task with commander’s intent and then allowing the units to generate the capability,” he explained, “we went to a bastardized thing off the back of some sloppy envelope for an RFF that was frankly just very cumbersome. It really tied our hands in terms of the flexibility of putting together a task organized unit of the 98th.” As the deployment of the 98th to Iraq proceeded, its employment varied considerably from his original concept. According to Helmly, “My original initiative was to use them in a training base capacity inside a foreign army…. What occurred, though, was that many of the 98th became embedded trainers inside Iraqi units.” Even so, he added, “the 98th soldiers did all very well and I admire and respect them greatly for that.” Helmly also notes that Iraq has focused the US Army on details, that the needs of “the long war” have been neglected, that the current method of foreign military sales and assistance is broken, and that an organization dedicated to training foreign militaries needs to exist. What’s more, personal agendas and institutional inertia contribute to these challenges.

With regard to the 98th Division deployment – LTG Helmly was asked what happened after the unit was deployed:

General Helmly: I visualized the FA-TRAC deploying and establishing a deployed version of an institutional training base. I saw us establishing a Fort Benning, Georgia or a Fort Knox, Kentucky inside Iraq and training civilians to become soldiers. What occurred, though, was that many of the 98th became embedded trainers inside Iraqi units. When I was a young private, when my unit was completing basic combat training it was announced that one of the drill sergeants I had was going to deploy as a platoon sergeant to Vietnam. A couple years later, I learned he had been killed – and he had been a very fine noncommissioned officer (NCO). The point of this is: everyone knows that the ultimate objective of any soldier is to engage in ground combat, but I thought the 98th would essentially do a training base kind of thing. But what actually happened was that many of these outstanding soldiers found themselves embedded inside Iraqi units. As a result, there were several who were killed or wounded in action who were operating more or less as advisors rather than trainers in a training base capacity. Had I known that, I wouldn’t have argued against using the 98th, but I would have understood things better from the beginning. My original initiative was to use them in a training base capacity inside a foreign army. After all, one of the things we’ve learned in this war is that clerks, cooks and truck drivers all have to be prepared to fight as infantrymen. I have to say, though, that the 98th soldiers did it all very well and I admire and respect them greatly for that.

The entire interview is fascinating reading – anyone with an interest in the workings at the Department of Army Level in 2004 and the revolutionary deployment of a training unit to the warzone to train and support the Iraqi Army under LTG Petraeus will want to scan the document found here. http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll13&CISOPTR=333&CISOBOX=1&REC=7

And – thanks LTG Helmly – for the compliment to our unit at the end… and for the confidence in our 98th Division soldiers –

Interviewer: The first part was your assessment of the 98th’s experience and performance over there.

LTG Helmly: I think due to the ability, willingness and courage of the individual soldier and small groups of soldiers, it was a success. That is the cornerstone of success. It proved we could take an organization that was not designed to deploy, put it into a significantly different set of conditions, and the small units and lower-ranking leaders would cause it to succeed. I think they added great capability and I was extremely impressed with them. It’s a tremendous group of soldiers. I saw many of them off before they left and they were positive. There wasn’t any talk of why they had to go do this mission. Of course they harbored their own personal fears as individual soldiers, but they were very proud. By the way, people tend to put stereotypes on things. A lot of people said we were just weekend warriors and things like that. Well, a lot of that first group of the 98th that deployed were drill sergeants and officers who had a lot of active duty time and commanded MTOE formations. They were really a high-speed group of capable and professional leaders. They were excited about the ability to buy into training and building up the Iraqi Army. Nobody was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor but there were a lot of heroes out there who didn’t get accorded that honor but who were nonetheless heroes in their own right. They suffered some pretty serious casualties. It was some really significant and outstanding history.

MNSTC-I is 5 years old

To think I was there nearly at the beginning … today I read that MNSTC-I “Minsticky” is 5 years old. I arrived at MNSTC-I in September 2004 just months after the LTG Petraeus took over the reins of the training effort for Iraq’s Military and Police forces. It was a tall order then and remains just as difficult as new requirements are born from the agreements with the Iraqi National Leadership. The article from MNSTC-I.

PHOENIX BASE, BAGHDAD - Coalition forces and NATO training mission military personnel gathered to celebrate the 234th birthday of the U. S. Army, established in June 1775; and the fifth anniversary of Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, established this month in 2004.

The Command also pinned a streamer to its flag representing award by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen, of the Joint Meritorious Unit Award. The JMU was presented to MNSTC-I for "exceptionally meritorious achievement" from May 1, 2007 to April 30, 2008.

MNSTC-I is the direct outgrowth of the need to create a new Iraqi Army. Subordinate to Multi-National Force - Iraq, the Command is responsible for assisting the Government of Iraq in providing for Iraq's internal security and external defense through the development of competent security ministries and professional, self-sufficient security forces that adhere to the rule of law.

I wish to congratulate MNSTC-I on 5 years, but don’t wish them many more…I’d love to hear the news that the mission is complete and the command’s flags are cased. So far the command has raised to the challenge, lets hope they are shortly successful in their task.

Reading History

I found this account of the 98th Division Action in support of MNSTC-I in 2004-2005. Its interesting to see how Historians have begun to record our actions in that period as well as see the perspective of what we knew was a significant challenge...I think we can take a sense of pride in the effort.

In the late summer and fall of 2004, the first group of advisors drawn from a US Army unit (as opposed to advisors drawn from individual volunteers or selectees) began to arrive in Iraq. Most of them were from the 98th Division (Institutional Training) or DIVIT, nicknamed the “Iroquois Warriors.”154 These Army Reserve Soldiers were cadres of senior NCOs and officers who in peacetime ran training schools and individual training programs for USAR and National Guard Soldiers. Major General James Helmly, chief of the USAR in 2003 and 2004, had begun studying the idea of deploying elements of a DIVIT in the late fall of 2003. Initially, the USAR, the Army G3, and the 98th Division discussed creating an organization known as the Foreign Army-Training Assistance Command (FA-TRAC) to conduct the mission. This organization would deploy to Iraq and provide the permanent command and control structure for other units and Soldiers involved in the ISF training program. Other Soldiers would form the ASTs that would conduct the training of Iraqi soldiers and mentoring of Iraqi units.

The training of foreign forces was not the designated mission for USAR institutional training divisions, and the Army never implemented the FA-TRAC concept because the establishment of MNSTC-I made it unnecessary. But Helmly tried hard to convince leaders on his own staff as well as those in the Department of the Army that the USAR could conduct the mission.155 The Army National Guard had assumed the mission of providing trainers for the Afghan Army training program in the summer of 2003, and Helmly admitted some institutional rivalry affected the process.156 To move the USAR closer to the point where it could play a major role in training the ISF, in May 2004 Helmly told Major General Bruce E. Robinson, commanding general of the 98th Division, to begin preparing for the mission.

The USAR proposed the concept of employing its units to man much of the new MNSTC-I organization to Lieutenant General Petraeus in the Pentagon on 2 June 2004, just days before he took command in Iraq. Petraeus approved the concept for further study. After a mission analysis by the 98th’s staff, a more complete plan was briefed to Major General Helmly on 15 June, and then to the Army G3, Lieutenant General Richard Cody, who approved it on 18 June 2004. Brigadier General Richard Sherlock, the assistant division commander of the 98th Division, and others in the USAR and 98th Division understood the mission to involve the establishment of training academies and individual training programs for the NIA at several locations. They also understood that the 98th would deploy a task-organized piece of the division that would be attached to MNSTC-I for the mission.157 The leaders of the 98th Division, however, found that more specific information about the details of the program was hard to come by in the Pentagon, especially because the inauguration of MNSTC-I focused attention and resources elsewhere.

Without a complete understanding of their mission, senior members of the division left for Iraq hoping to begin preparations for the arrival of their Soldiers. Colonel Frank Cipolla, a commander for an engineer basic training brigade in the division, led a three-man team to Iraq a week later as the advance party. Sherlock and nine others joined them for a reconnaissance and analysis of the mission from mid-July to early August. During their trip, the 98th’s leaders discovered that MNSTC-I already had a command and control structure in place and needed individuals, not units, to man that structure. They also learned that the 98th’s mission would begin with training new recruits and units, but that the division’s Soldiers assigned to the ASTs would stay with their Iraqi units after they graduated and became operational. This was a surprise and represented a dramatic increase in the scope of the mission for the 98th because it expanded their role from simply preparing new soldiers during their initial training to advising them in combat.158

Between late 2004 and late 2005 approximately 900 Soldiers of the 98th Division served in MNSTC-I as members of the command’s staff, as school instructors, and as advisors to Iraqi units. Iroquois Soldiers manned 31 of the first 39 ASTs envisioned for the initial three divisions of the Iraqi Army, the others were manned by the Marines and some by Coalition nations.159 Before deploying, these Reservists attended stateside training at Camp Atterbury, Indiana, to prepare for the mission. Many of them considered the training to be of limited value as the Army and the Atterbury trainers themselves were unfamiliar with the mission for which they were preparing the Iroquois Soldiers to perform. On arrival in Kuwait, they completed some theater-specific training before moving into Iraq; this training was more focused and useful.160 Once part of MNSTC-I, the members of the 98th Division worked through the growing pains of becoming comfortable with the enlarged scope of their mission. Some of them also endured open skepticism from Active Duty counterparts about their ability to do the advisory mission.161 The AST members met their new Iraqi recruits in basic training, trained with them to develop individual and unit skills, and then accompanied them after graduation on operational missions in 2005.

While they lacked the tactical experience of Soldiers from Active and National Guard combat units, Petraeus credited the Soldiers of the 98th Division with providing a much needed boost to MNSTC-I due to their expertise with building and operating the institutional training systems of a modern army. Although their experience was in training individual soldiers in a school setting, most Soldiers of the 98th Division made the transition to combat advisors successfully. They steadily developed tactical competence as they trained with their Iraqi units and then deployed with them into combat.162 For some in the division, it was obvious they had accepted a mission for which their previous experience had not prepared them, and a few had difficulty transitioning to the demands of advising units in combat. Still, the great majority adapted and felt they had shown how the USAR Soldier could meet the complex challenges posed by the Iraqi operational environment. Indeed, a large number of advisors from the 98th Division went into combat with their Iraqi units in major operations like AL FAJR in the city of Fallujah in November 2004.163 Command Sergeant Major Milt Newsome, who served in Iraq with the division in 2004–2005, expressed the pride felt by the Iroquois Warriors on their return, stating, “I’m very proud to be a member of the 98th Division because history will realize what the 98th Division and all those who supported us had to do, and did. . . . When all the ashes settle, you’ll see the silhouette of the 98th Division and you can say it was a job well done.164

As a result of the lessons learned in the fall of 2004, MNF-I and MNSTC-I began making major improvements to the advisor training and support programs. These changes took place outside the timeframe of this book, but they help highlight the challenges faced by the 98th Division and other Soldiers who were part of this initial wave of advisors. One of the first steps was to improve stateside mobilization training in early 2005. MNSTC-I also established the Phoenix Academy at Taji in early 2005 to provide a 10-day course conducted by members of the 98th Division focused on the latest tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) used by existing advisor teams. In the spring of 2005 the Coalition also changed its term for unit advisor teams from AST to Military Transition Teams (MiTT) to better reflect their mission. Finally, MNSTC-I established the Iraqi Assistance Group in April 2005 to provide better command, control, and logistical support to US advisors working with Iraqi units after they transitioned from training under MNSTC-I control to the operational control of units in the MNC-I, the Coalition’s tactical command.

Soldiers in the next wave of advisors, for which the USAR’s 80th DIVIT formed the core, benefited from these improvements. But they too faced new challenges. The first wave of advisors had linked up with and trained their Iraqi units when they were first formed; thus, they were able to develop personal relationships with their Iraqi counterparts before conducting operations. Many advisors in the next wave reported to Iraqi units already in combat. Their learning curve was steep and time to build cohesion and trust was almost nonexistent. The Army continued in 2005 to find the right mix of training, personnel, techniques, and processes for advising the ISF.

Another Update on BB

This article released - the 744th MP Battalion is done with their mission and should be on their way home soon - as of December 18, 2008

Press Release
519th MP Battalion Transfers Authority with 744th MP Battalion

CAMP CROPPER, Iraq – Lt. Col. Enrique Guerra, 744th Military Police Battalion Commander, transferred authority to Lt. Col. Bradley Graul, 519th MP Battalion Commander, during a ceremony Tuesday at Camp Cropper, Iraq.


This ceremony marks the 744th MP Battalion’s second deployment to Iraq. From 2003 - 2004 the Allentown, Pa., based unit accomplished its first mission in Iraq and received the Meritorious Unit Citation and Iraq Campaign streamer. In addition to their two tours to Iraq, this unit has also deployed to Kosovo since Sept. 11, 2001.


Brig. Gen. Robert Kenyon, Task Force MP North Commander, stated, “The 744th MP Battalion was central towards our winning the counterinsurgency struggle, protecting our Coalition forces and the good people of Iraq.”


Under their command and control, Remembrance II Theater Interment Facility had a decrease of internal violence and a drop of its recidivism rate from over 8% to less than 0.5%.


The 519th MP Battalion has participated in every major military engagement since WWII and, on 16 separate occasions, deployed its units in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.


Brig. Gen. David Quantock, Task Force 134 Commander, Detention Operations, presided over the ceremony and witnessed Lt. Col. Bradley Graul and Command Sgt. Maj. John Williamson uncase the 519th MP Battalion colors.


Task Force 134 is responsible for all detainee operations in Iraq to ensure care and custody of detainees with dignity and respect until a safe and fair release can be accomplished in conjunction with the Government of Iraq.

This means that the B and her unit should be home soon....god speed

MNSTC-I Life is different

Got a letter from a fellow soldier and Friend – “Sully” who remained in the Reserves and has subsequently been redeployed to Iraq. He sent me a note the other day with an update on the changes in Iraq and MNSTC-I sine we first arrived there in September 2004.

Hey Stan,

Talking about you yesterday so had to write. One of my teams found a few conex's full of electrical equipment, new construction stuff, so I contacted the local 20th Engineer Brigade, a fairly massive unit which is the MiTT for the Iraqi Engineers, and sent an email to their commander to find out if any of his Battalions could use the stuff before it gets destroyed. Turns out its Duke DeLuca!

Duke was the J-7 at MNSTC-I in 2004-2005 and a spectacular team builder. He is now the Commander of the 20th Engineer Brigade.

Sully discusses greetings from Duke and some details of events in MNSTC-I then goes on to say

I'm commanding a Task Force which consists entirely of 100 US Airforce personnel who go FOB to FOB cleaning up excess material, vehicles, supplies, weapons, and whatnot. It is simple command but pays two college tuitions, plus I'm at my leisure to travel as I wish, but only by air! Quite a different tour than our last.

Our last tour we traveled by unarmored SUV to start then gradually received armored HUMMVs. Sully and I were very well traveled in country due to our assignments. About MNSTC-I

Did you know MNSTC-I now has 15 general officers!!! Phoenix base is one of only two bases in the Green Zone by year's end (plus the new Embassy Complex) and has its own housing, mess hall, and every building is 2 stories plus! Hardly recognizable. The Phoenix base actually extends to include the liberty pool in its compound! Our old housing is all gone. The green zone should be no more by early next year. Life sure is different. Take care.

Yes life is different – We had 3 Generals in MNSTC-I when we were there. One being LTG Petreaus at the time now there are 15 billets…wow!! The Green Zone was pretty extensive and definitely rustic as compared to accommodations at Victory Base. We were the outpost in the middle of Baghdad at the time.

I have since retired after my return and a last assignment to Hurricane Katrina cleanup. I have a daughter over in Iraq now…I have taken a cheerleader/ armchair quarterback position now. In that light the note from Sully made me reflect that there are still thousands of individual contributions being made with little fanfare in Iraq and I’d thought I’d offer a glimpse into this one.

BB Update

Its been a while since I updated you on BB’s status. She is back in Iraq with her unit after her R&R. She called us recently to tell us that she has been promoted to Specialist 4 (E-4) rank. She is glad about the promotion, and very pleased with it all.

Spec 4, Speedy 4, and other terms provide some insight to the grade – as found in Wikopedia

In deference to the original rating of Specialist 4, the modern day rank of Specialist is also sometimes known as "SpecFour." Slang terms for the rank of Specialist include "E-4 Mafia," indicating a reference to the large number of soldiers of E-4 rank who see their roles as performing the "grunt work" in the army. The Mafia reference is derived from some Specialists who are in positions to do favors for other Army specialists, such as supply administration specialists, but sometimes do not show equal generosity to senior enlisted, officers, or privates. The rank of Specialist is sometimes called a "Sham Shield": E-4s are the most experienced of the lower ranks and have usually figured out how to "sham" out of details. A specialist is sometimes ironically called a "full bird private", a play on "full bird colonel." During the Vietnam era, a Specialist 5 would sometimes refer to himself as a "Private E-5" to indicate that his duties and privileges were not different from what they had been when he was a private.


So now Specialist BB is working the overnight shift Currently 0000hrs to 1400hrs so she doesn’t have much free time. She is settled into new accommodations and has made it her home away from home.

The Army has been good for her, she has matured tremendously but of course she still is my little girl .

Just stay out deserter

Read today this article

A U.S. soldier who fled to Canada because he refused to serve in Iraq has been deported, and now faces a possible court martial.
Robin Long crossed the border into Canada in 2005. Last October, he was arrested in Nelson, B.C., on a Canada-wide warrant.
He called military operations in Iraq "an illegal war of aggression."
On Monday, Federal Court of Canada Justice Anne Mactavish said Long did not provide enough convincing evidence that he will face irreparable harm if he's sent back to the United States.

Another soldier had to take this soldier’s place… he volunteered apparently feeling no shame in bailing out of his contract. Frankly I have no problem with him staying in Canada or any other country for that matter… let him renounce his citizenship as an empty gesture – he should be prohibited from ever stepping foot on US soil again as he is unwilling to stand up to his promise and bond to serve it.

The Combat Patch

Many civilians do not know the tradition of the combat patch. This is a patch placed on a soldier’s right shoulder. I realize that my Daughter’s unit should be handing out wartime or “combat” patches and I thought I’d offer a little primer on something that most Army soldiers know about in this day and age.

In the Army’s regulatory language

Shoulder sleeve insignia-former wartime service (SSI–FWTS)
a. General. Authorization to wear a shoulder sleeve insignia indicating former wartime service applies only to soldiers who are assigned to U.S. Army units that meet all the following criteria. Soldiers who were prior members of other Services that participated in operations that would otherwise meet the criteria below are not authorized to wear
the SSI–FWTS. Wear is reserved for individuals who were members of U.S. Army units during the operations.
(1) The Secretary of the Army or higher must declare as a hostile environment the theater or area of operation to which the unit is assigned, or Congress must pass a Declaration of War.
(2) The units must have actively participated in, or supported ground combat operations against hostile forces in which they were exposed to the threat of enemy action or fire, either directly or indirectly.
(3) The military operation normally must have lasted for a period of thirty (30) days or longer. An exception may be made when U.S. Army forces are engaged with a hostile force for a shorter period of time, when they meet all other criteria, and a recommendation from the general or flag officer in command is forwarded to the Chief of Staff, Army.

What all that really means is that a soldier may put a patch on their right shoulder for providing service that takes them into a hostile foreign land and lays down a whole year away from family, friends, civilian pursuits and leisure pursuits.

The danger in the wartime service is evident when you look at the number of soldiers we mourn today from operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. Take nothing away from this deployment and these soldiers. They face incoming rockets and the threat of [roadside bombs] on a daily basis, and remember, success or importance of a mission is not calculated by number of soldiers lost in the mission. Each soldier here is fulfilling a duty, serving their country and being a part of history.

So many soldiers go through a brief ceremony after a period in country which goes something like Attention to orders, “Having proven themselves under enemy fire while serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom, (these soldiers) are hereby awarded the unit combat patch forevermore to be worn on the right sleeve in testimony of their selfless service.”

With the patch – the soldier so presented has a significant symbol of the fact that the nation honors them, fellow soldiers honor them, and that’s why they are given a patch to remember forevermore that they were a part of a combat or wartime service effort and sacrifice. I hope that the newest members of the Army receiving a combat patch reflect on the sentiment of thanks that this old soldier notes with the passing of that small patch of cloth.

Where in the world is the B?

To continue updating my few readers on the status of my daughter I can offer the following details. BB is her nickname and I will use that from here forward to identify her status.

B is in Kuwait as of this writing – with her unit in additional training (she says for the 3-4th time they have been doing these tasks). The routine is tedious and “boring” and there is a lot of “lets get to the job” sentiment in the unit. She has been a nomad for the last several days. As she put it “she would like to sleep on the same cot twice in a row” She is living thru a very transient period that most everyone going to or from Iraq has to endure.

I expect that she and her unit will move to their final assigned location shortly and there will be a little bit more stabilization in the routine. The sleeping on cots may not change much over the course of the next year – the living conditions are Spartan in country. She continues to participate, as all of the soldiers in her unit are, in a great sacrifice of personal comfort and freedom to contribute to the Army’s mission. Many don’t realize that in addition to the dangers of the task that soldiers must endure a standard of living and conditions for 12-15 months that are akin to imprisonment in this country.

A loss of personal freedom to meet the tasks of our democracy, freely taken up by a volunteer force of a few, for the good of all.

My Baby is a soldier - update

My daughter is assigned to a Army Reserve Military Police Battalion and has been training for two months in preparation for deployment. I wrote about my daughter’s progress through the training process before and I remain in marvel of the system that transformed my little Girl into a soldier.

We recently had 4 days with her during a Pass from the training (in fact the training is completed) She was picked up from the Barracks that served as one of her temporary homes at the training installation. Most of the training tour period was spend in tents in January and February in the field locations to maximize the training realism of conditions that would be faced over the next year. (probably really because of a lack of space at Ft. Dix which if anyone remembers was BRACed years ago and scheduled to close) As before the unit has a strong sense of efficiency, team atmosphere, competence and determination.

During the 4 days she did the normal 19 Year old type of things, trips to the mall although she didn’t want to purchase much as she would be able to use or wear it for another 10 months. A little bit of networking with friends and sleeping in at home. At the end of 4 days she was ready to return to her new family – her team to get started on the task at hand.

The unit will be departing for overseas shortly with the task of conducting its mission in Iraq. She will be part of an effort often in the shadows for many … including her peers from high school who still worry about fashion, what is in and out and where is the next party. I sense that she knows that it takes silent patriots, like her, to preserve that way of life for her friends. Like many that have served in OIF, she makes up the vanguard of today’s Army quiet heroes.

OIF Contract Frauds

Although not on the forefront of the news lately, I did a little search about contract fraud and some of the more notable Army Officers that participated in such activities over the last several years. I liked into the case of Maj John Cockerham. Cockerham faces an April trial on charges he took $9.6 million in bribes in 2004 and 2005 from firms seeking business with the U.S. military in Kuwait and Iraq. Companies that did not accept entreaties to bribe this officer found their contracts terminated. Others received unfair competition for contracts which may have resulted in awards that were not merited.

Another individual allegedly involved was Major Gloria Davis, another contracting officer. Maj Davis killed herself in December, a day after admitting to Army investigators that she took $225,000 in bribes from contractors.

These two “officer” sought personal gain in completing their duties. While the impact on me and other soldiers may seem slight…whether we had shabby poorly maintained living conditions, risk of substandard food, water or other service, but it was real. To date there 36 people indicted to date on Iraq war-contract crimes per the Justice Department.

I read accounts from sites about these two officers in particular that praises their service, bemoans that they are pawns of the system. I even saw that Maj Davis has a headstone in Arlington Cemetery just like any other veteran that served honorably.

My point of note here is that these soldiers forgot a key tenet of Army Values … Selfless service

Selfless Service
Put the welfare of the nation, the Army, and your subordinates before your own.
Selfless service leads to organizational teamwork and encompasses discipline, self-control and faith in the system.

These two at least contributed to matters that will impact other soldiers in the future. The Army Contracting apparatus is severely undermanned and will now have untold additional measures to control, restrict (read choke) its utility to quickly support soldier needs. I can guarantee somewhere a soldier will go days longer easting MREs in a new operations waiting for contracted services to be awarded under the new bureaucracy that will be established as a result of these two selfish individual’s actions.

They violated the trust that other soldiers expected in them. They may still be loved by their families, highly regarded by their communities, but in my mind and that of soldiers that relied upon their service… We were let down … These soldiers served … not the Army, not the soldier in the field, not the Army Values… They served deceit, lies, greed and themselves.

Supporting our Soldiers

I often get asked what to send to soldiers by family members, friends, legion members. Often times I like to take time to discover the individual that they are sending packages to or learn that they feel a need to do something for military personnel stationed overseas during the Holidays. Many of the things I received in country were through the kindness of people sending stuff through organizations of companies that worked to acknowledge the service of sldiers – especially over the holidays.

Nothing beats a letter, package from loved ones sent directly to a soldier… Its easy enough to do once you have the soldiers address in country… its so great to get mail. If you don’t know a soldier serving personally, the military no longer accepts mail addressed to "Any Service Member" but there are still dozens of ways you can show your support to the American Soldier and the U.S. Army.

Many independent organizations are ready and willing to help support the troops. You can go to this site to get a short list of organizations that will help you send messages, packages and other mementos of support to troops.

http://www4.army.mil/outreach/support/

Most of the organizations listed are nonpartisan, non-political groups and organizations that work to support U.S. deployed and wounded troops in harm's way. Many are managed by volunteers.

Take a moment this holiday season to check out the support agencies and see if you can support our soldiers…I can say on behalf of one former soldier that it is certainly appreciated.

Pictures from Iraq

They are now a little dated - but I have had several requests for the links for the two windows media files that I assembled that tell a little about my time in Iraq.

The pictures are nearly entirely my own... I felt the music complimented the mood at the time very well.

My own video of my time in Iraq


A more humorous look at Iraq
Mortaritaville


I heard the song (Mortaritaville) while I was with MNSTC-I in the IZ in fall of 2004 - that song struck a chord with me as a Reservist in Iraq and I have the MP3 file of the song that I pulled off the network over there. We listened to it in our shop and when on the road in thin skinned vehicles...

It was recorded by JR Schultz and Nick Brown a couple National Guard soldiers in the IZ in the fall of 2004 at FOB Warrior. They were with the 1/153 inf from the Arkansas National Guard's 39th Brigade. I asked them permission to share it with a wider audience - As fellow soldiers stationed in Iraq I appreciate the sentiment in the song and I felt compelled to add some of my pictures from Iraq to complete the sentiment.

Their site says

"We started writing songs while serving in Iraq with no predetermined ambitions beyond pleasing family and friends. However, as our music was passed around, we were thrilled to find that everyone seemed to enjoy it. We are not professional singers, songwriters, or musicians. We represent the average soldier serving in Iraq."

These guys just sell these CDs off the web at their site Iraq Songs and don't do any promotion to speak of so it always helps to get a little assistance from those who enjoy the music. They said

"Turns out, sounds like you were one of the first to get your hands on the song, we recorded it in the IZ in the fall of 2004 at FOB Warrior. We were with the 1/153 inf from the Arkansas National Guard's 39th Brigade. I know our music has made it's rounds with e-mail and file sharing and I really think most people would like to know where they could hear the rest of our music. I recently ran into an electrician and after talking to him a while, learned he did some private contract work in Mosul, Iraq in 05-06. Out of curiosity, I asked him if he'd ever heard "Mortaritaville" and he actually had it on his iPod."

As in every conflict - sometimes the songs that come out speak volumes about the truths of service - Motaritaville gives a little bit of what did I get myself into message and reflects that even in the uncertainty of a war zone we can still laugh at ourselves as soldiers... Hats off to these soldiers for sharing with us.

U.S. Didn't Track Weapons

Once again there is the continued witch hunt regarding the accountability of weapons within MNSTC-I as noted in the Associated Press Report: U.S. Didn't Track Weapons For Iraqis written by By Richard Lardner. In the article the issue that has been known of the thousands of rifles, pistols, sets of body armor, vehicles and radios, along with millions of rounds of ammunition, had been delivered to Iraqis which could not be accounted for.

As I have said previously in this Blog that we were pushed to deliver an equipped Iraqi Army and security force from Scratch (thanks to decisions made in March 2004). In the headlong push to arm Iraqi forces we did not adequately keep good records. For what its worth, there still is no regulatory guidance for just what exactly is the prescribed standard for such accountability. What we know in hindsight is that an accountant today cannot reconstruct with the records what happened to 190,000 weapons according to one audit.

An October 2006 audit by the special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction said there was "questionable accuracy" and "incomplete accountability" in the way MNSTC-I managed weapons. Again – the luxury of detailed recordkeeping in a war zone with a foreign military is not an easy task by any standard.

What I like is the response from Retired Army Maj. Gen. Paul Eaton

He expected the inspector general would find that there were too few people to handle the enormous influx of weapons and money into the country. One of the greatest irritants to me was watching the Pentagon cooking along at full strength while we in Iraq were running on a very thin personnel shoestring.

MG Eaton preceded Gen Petraeus and has made an accurate but overlooked observation.

I stated in my Blog previously that in MNSTC-I we were pressed to do many things quickly, not with quality…. Americans, Politicians and the Press all expected performance that continues to prove elusive. As MG Eaton says further in the article

There have never been enough people, and there has never been enough bureaucratic support and effort to do this thing properly

And I have noted before that Gen Petraeus said many times in country to those of us on his staff “this experience is like building an aircraft that is already in flight."

The 20-20 hindsight of those that were not there is not really in focus in my mind... It should be filtered through the effort and intent.

Iraqi Security Force Training

The News from Iraq reflects the reports from an independent Commission created by congress that estimates it will take at least 12-18 Months before Iraq’s Army and Police can take charge of their country.

A report by an independent commission created by Congress says that it will be at least 12 to 18 months before Iraq’s army and police can take charge of the country’s security. The 20-member commission, headed by Gen. James L. Jones of the Marines, now retired, found that the Iraqi armed forces, especially the army, were steadily improving but still suffering from “limited operational effectiveness, according to a copy of the panel’s report that was being circulated Wednesday in advance of its formal release. David Cloud, New York Times, September 6, 2007

In my mind, that assessment bears some correlation to my own observations that we continue to train countless Iraqis and don’t witness their effective utilization. MNSTC-I effectively trains candidates for these forces but there exists a revolving door in units for the soldiers who often do not last at duty locations in the field when placed under local (Iraqi) control. We don’t control implementation and retention of the number of Police and soldiers already trained in country. That remains under Iraqi control entirely. The losses and continued waste of trained Iraqi Soldiers and Police is due to continued sectarian purging of the ranks, corruption of the government and Interior Ministries and to a lesser extent the Ministry of Defense in Iraq.

Its easy to be critical of the senior Iraqi Military and its establishment until you realize that it was formed from absolutely nothing. What we take for granted – senior well experienced and seasoned officer and NCOs in our forces does not exist in large scale in Iraq in the Military or Police. The basic command and control functions, to include logistical planning and support were vaporized and will take time to re-establish. All of these tasks have been approached concurrent with the fight in Iraq by MNSTC-I. as quoted to many in MNSTC-I “its like building an airplane while in flight”

Couple the nascent infrastructure difficulties with a “less than capable and new government subjected to serious rifts and divides” and you have a significant challenge within any timeline.

Is the assessment correct? Probably understates the time required if Iraqi institutional issues are not resolved quickly. Replacing large blocks of the Iraqi security forces and retraining new will result in the same inefficiencies if the handover of newly trained forces continues to a government that is unable to resolve sectarian and corruption difficulties. That is the root of the issue that must be addressed to improve the effectiveness of the security forces in Iraq.

Iraqi Weapons Buyback Program

As the clamor over guns in the hands of the wrong people surfaces again here in the States as a result of the terrible and unfortunate events at Virginia Tech – I was reminded of a program that may have some utility in Iraq. In poor/ crime ridden intercity locations here in the states the Police offer gun buyback programs to collect guns from individuals.

Is it conceivable to conduct some sort of weapons buyback program in Iraq – buy back weapons, ammo, explosives, fuses, blasting devices? Think of it – offer $50 dollars for the turn in of an AK47 – offer $1.00 pound for explosives, .01 per bullet – you would be encouraging some enterprising individuals to actually go out and find materials that are currently being used against coalition and Iraqi security forces. IED buried by your neighbor gets reported and turned in for profit instead of left to do its terrible deed. You could offer higher amounts for particularly problematic devices.

OK - naysayers will provide that some will cheat the system and bring in only inoperative weapons, stolen materials, etc… but to my way of thinking, the treat of reporting and opportunist behavior will negatively affect insurgents that would now have to dedicate resources to secure cashes, monitor IEDs, etc…. Imagine that keeping explosives in your house becomes a financial incentive for someone else that results in all sorts of complications. Anyone stumbling across a pile of munitions has discovered the equivalent of gold. The collection mechanism may be a little complicated – the preference would be to be directed to the materials and destroy them in place (to include the location containing them) Harboring or storing materials that are bound to be reported is a no win situation if it means your dwelling sustains collateral damage … quick honey get the mortar rounds out of the house… lets put them in the field, call them in and collect some real cash.

Perhaps the concept and explanation are very crude, but would it work? Would seem relatively inexpensive, drives market forces to raise the cost of the materials for insurgents, provides a real incentive for opportunist to sniff out cashes and storage points. The results may warrant an attempt at least – petty cash in the hands of our soldiers patrolling – handed out when materials are located and collected? May bear some consideration....

Colonel Ted Westhusing

Col Ted Westhusing died in Iraq in June 2005. I recently looked up his name in an internet search as I was searching sites related to events that occurred when I was stationed in Iraq. I was disturbed to read the conspiracy theories and conjecture that Col Westhusing’s name had attached to it in several sites. Many of the sites suggested that Col Westhusing was murdered in a plot from a contractor in country. These site contrive all manner of reason’s that support their theories that Col Westhusing was killed. All of the theories are manipulations of the truth.

As noted in several sites, friends and family struggle with the idea that Westhusing could have killed himself. He was a loving father and husband and a devout Catholic. He was an extraordinary intellect and had mastered ancient Greek and Italian. He had less than a month before his return home. It seemed impossible that anything could crush the spirit of a man with such a powerful sense of right and wrong.

Officially, Ted died of a non-combat injury at Camp Dublin near the Baghdad Airport. The Army conducted an investigation into the death, which was concluded and reported to have been suicide.

We served MNSTC-I together - He was the Chief of CPATT working for MG Fil who was a demanding boss. Ted was extremely frustrated, tired, and irritable in the days prior to his death. Unfortunately - my last discussion with Ted was a bitter fight over Installation issues for one of the many Police units which was troubling him and causing him considerable angst. The fight was one of considerable passion on both sides to do what was right in our minds to support the burgeoning Iraqi Police units being created. Col Westhusing and I fought for over an hour until spent and concluded to work the matter out at a later date. I left for my 2 week R&R a day later and a few days before COL Westhusing’s death. Upon my return I had many discussions with COL Westhusing’s subordinates, peers and others as we were a close knit group and had daily interaction over the events on the day of his death. I am sure that Col Westhusing’s death was a suicide as reported.

I have posted on my blog one of the last pictures taken with Col Westhusing just weeks before his death. We have talked about our sorrow many times since at the loss of a dedicated warrior. His death stunned all who knew him. All of us that worked with Col Westhusing wondered whether we missed signs of depression. Typical of many in the environment Col Westhusing had been losing weight and not sleeping well. He was a perfectionist and very hard on himself and was well regarded for his efforts to corral the Iraqi Ministry of Interior to make progress in training Iraqi police and Police special forces.

Col Westhusing served his country as a volunteer in Iraq. He had one of the toughest jobs in MNSTC-I by many accounts. He was driven to get the job done to the army standard which may have been the source of his frustrations. We did not become friends in that trying environment because we were soldiers that did the job with blind stoicism… perhaps we should have talked on a more personal level, but there was never enough time. He should be honored for his life, not used as a tool for conspiracy theorists in his unfortunate and untimely death.

You can read a reasonble account of his death here
http://www.unknownnews.org/0512021127Westhusing.html

Army Facilities in Disrepair

A Washington Post article series over the weekend described "The Other Walter Reed," where overdoses, suicide attempts and depression among outpatients are the parallel narrative to the spit-polish hallways of the renowned hospital. The series described the horrible conditions found in the soldier living areas in the Walter Reed complex that face soldiers in Medical hold after service in OIF/OEF theaters. One building was singled out - Building 18, in particular, symbolizes the indifference and neglect that many of the wounded say they experience at Walter Reed.

The Army reacted in un-characteristic manner and it seems the commandant at Walter Reed said that parts of the building had been repaired and soldiers were working to improve the outside of the building, including removing ice and snow. We are told that Walter Reed and Army officials have been "meeting continuously for three days" since the articles began appearing.

It’s a shame that it takes a major expose by a mainstream newspaper to get that kind of action within the Army. I must admit the articles improved The Washington Post news organizations standing in my book.

Many outside the military are not aware of the sorry state of repair of Military facilities for training, maintaining, providing care, feeding and housing soldiers. The responsibility for maintenance of Military facilities was centralized from Local commanders several years ago to the Installation Management Agency (IMA). IMA has never been adequately funded nor lived up to even its basic responsibility for maintaining adequate facilities for soldiers in the Army. Go to any Military Installation and you will find all manner of substandard facilities with mold, leaky roofs, HVAC issues and other major problems. It is even more shameful that conditions for our most vulnerable soldiers, those wounded in Combat, also reflect the neglect found throughout the Army.

The not so simple issue here is the funding – As a soldier I want good equipment to do the job before any funds are expended for facilities… given the limited resources available it is a tough choice that Army Facilities must make for the dollars. The need for transformation dollars, heavy OPTEMPO and other funding demands will exacerbate the issue even further in the Army which shoulders most of the fight with a disproportionately smaller share of the funding. Most Army soldiers are awed by Air Force facilities when we are allowed to see them…. funding and appropriation to soldier needs seems to be key.

At Walter Reed the Commandant said the medical center has received an outpouring of concern about conditions and procedures since the articles appeared and has taken steps to improve what soldiers and their families describe as a messy battlefield of bureaucratic problems and mistreatment. The remainder of soldiers around the globe will not see a change in their facilities except for the worse if the Army must continue to fund operational needs from facility maintenance dollars. I’d certainly like to see The Washington Post open the story up and take a tour of soldier facilities elsewhere as well… I know there is a story to be told that the recruiting posters hide, and the Army Leadership must avoid given other more pressing needs.